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Draft 1
QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF AMBASSADOR BY YOMIURI NEY.7SPAPER
1)

Since the end of World 'Nar II, Japanese-American relations

have become close with the Japan-US Security Treaty serving
as an axis.

We have been able to solve such difficult issues

as the reversion of Okinawa, the textile negotiations, etc.
through the spirit of friendship.

Our economic relationship,

however, is becoming increasingly difficult with the recent
sharp fluctuations of currency values, i.e., the depreciating
dollar and the appreciating yen constituting a central problem.
Prime Minister Fukuda is going to visit the United States with
the hope of achieving a smooth resolution of these difficult
problems.

Hhat does the United States expect or desire most

from the Prime Minister's visit?

2)

Japan's current account surplus is inviting negative

reactions from the U.S., Europe and Oceania, resulting in
mounting pressure for Japan to limit her exports and increase
her imports.

However, there are not many manufactured goods

for Japan to import, and a limit has been reached in Japan's
importation of primary products.

Because of the stronger yen,

many of the export industries in Japan are on the verge of
bankrup~cy.

Looking at the situation from your vantage point

as an ambassador well versed in the Japanese domestic scene,
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how do you view Japan's efforts to improve its trade relationship
and possible limitations of such efforts?

3)

We can to some extent understand the criticisms directed

against Japan.

But it is also a fact, is it not, that

American companies are not working hard enough to export and
that protectionism is emerging in the United States.

Will

you comment on the American domestic situation?

4)

I
I

The current trend toward a stronger yen and weaker dollar

involves a factor of speculation, causing an abnormal shift
in the yen-dollar exchange rate.

Another factor here is the

huge oil imports by the United States.

Can we expect the

United States to take measures to defend the dollar?

5)

The Japanese Government hopes to achieve a 7% economic

growth rate for this year.

Does the United States regard this

aim as a pledge to which Japan is internationally committed?
Experts in Japan think it difficult for Japan to achieve 7 %
growth.

What do you think the United States reaction will

be if this is not achieved?

As for Japan's efforts to

reduce her current account surplus, the policy of the Japanese
Governme nt is to reduce the surplus to six billion dollars.
Do you think this can be done?
in this regard?

What do you wish Japan to do
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I'd like to ask you about the U.S.' China policy as part

of its overall Far East policy.

First, is the United States

contemplating a new development in its China policy?

I

would like to hear about specific ideas on normalization of
US-China relations and the Taiwan issue.

Secondly, what effect

will Japan's conclusion the Japan-China Peace and Amity
Treaty have on US policy toward China?

What is your frank

view on the "hegemony clause", a big political issue pending
between Japan and China.

7}

The Soviet Union is opposed to the conclusion of any Japan-

China Treaty which contains a "hegemony clause".

Do you

think that concluding such a treaty with China will adversely
affect Ja9an's relations with the Soviet Union?

I wish to

get America 's basic thinking on this issue in connection with
US policy toward the Soviet Union.

8)

I'd like to ask about the Japan-US security relationship.

Does the United States thin k that Japan should continue her
defense efforts?

If so, what do you think Japan should do

in spe8ific terms?

9)

US withdrawal of its ground force from South Korea will

have a considerable impact on security in North East Asia in
th e light of the fact that the Soviet Union holds the command
of the Japan Sea.

Does this pull-out signify a modification

l
of

us

toward Korea?

- 4 Do you think the US Congress'

investigations into Korea influence peddling activities
will affect US policy

[

to,~ard

South Korea?

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to the United States in a
few days symbolizes the close and continuing friendship between
our two countries. Our economic ties have strengthened greatly
in the last few years. Our two-way trade is now about $30
billion per year.
There is also renewed interest in investments
in both countries.
It is true that the visit comes at ~'time
of increasingly difficult problems relating to our economic relationship.
I do not expect that the Prime Minister will want to
deal in detail with these problems while in the United States,
but I would expect that there will be an effort to set the
stage for a continuing effort to resolve them in ways which are
satisfactory to both sides. The visit will show that both sides
continue to share confidence in the value and the importance of
our relationship.
2.
I know that Japan is engaging in a tremendous effort to
strengthened its trade relationship with the United States and
other countries and to achieve a better balance in its economic
relations with the rest of the world. This is a very difficult
problem for Japan to solve, and it will take time.
It does
cause strains on certain export industries in Japan, but on
the other hand the Japanese economy has shown in the past that it
is quite flexible and can adapt to the changing international
situation.
I don't really agree that there are not many manufactured goods
for Japan to import. The Japanese Import Promotion Mission to
the United States found a large number of American firms that
are interested in exporting manufactured products to Japan and
they found that our prices are competitive.
It is fair to say
that the problem of expanding Japanese imports will not be
solved overniqht, but we must take the first steps.

3. The United States has been going through a very difficult
period in recent months. We need a stronger energy program
and domestic legislation to support that program. The recent
coal strike lasted a very long time and caused considerable
damage. Various factors are combining now to create a threat
of renewed inflation in the United States. President Carter
is moving to answer that threat and to assure that the United
States economy remains competitive in international markets.
I often have been told that American companies do not do enough
to strengthen exports, and I agree that there is considerable
truth in that observation. Many American companies have conUNCLASSIFIED
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centrated all their efforts to expand sales on their large
horne market. However, that outlook seems to be changing and
American companies are becoming much more aggressive about
exports.
Protectionism in the United States develops especially when
jobs are seen to be at stake. At horne we often hear complaints
that the United States is an open market for foreign producers,
but that foreign countries are not equally open to American
products. We need to make very sure that that statement is
not true, and wherever barriers to the movement of trade are
unfair we need to work to get rid of them.
4.
I am deeply concerned about the value and the stability
of the dollar and I recognize how important they are to other
countries which use it as a key currency. We are taking new
measures to strengthen the dollar. The President has just
announced a program to curb inflation. He also has urged Congress to act on a tax reform bill which would encourage increased business investment in the United States. Energy
legislation is another important area in which we should see
favorable results soon.
5. We have had very frank and detailed discussions with Japan
at all levels on the subject of international economic and
trade problems. On both sides I think there is full agreement
that it would be a very good thing if Japan can achieve a
relatively high rate of growth. We understand of course that
that rate will not be as high as Japan's post-war average.
Japan's present current account surplus is extremely high.
The imbalance in Japan's global position imposes burdens on
foreign countries. It won't be easy to change the situation,
but we must work together to achieve a real change as soon as
possible.
I do not want to try to predict the exact size of
Japan's current account surplus in the future.
The Japanese
government has given every indication of its intention to
correct the situation. I would like to give that objective
as much support as I can.
Over the next few months we will be in almost continuous contact with Japanese leaders. The Prime Minister will be visiting
Washington. Ambassador Strauss and Minister Ushiba will be in
frequent contact, especially to discuss the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations in Geneva.
In the early fall I expect there will
be an economic sub-cabinet meeting. These meetings will give
us ample opportunity to review the situation as it develops.
I can't predict what will be decided.
I do hope that Japan's
economy will be growing at a high rate and that the current
account surplus will come down.
If more needs to be done, I
am confident that we will cooperate in working out what steps
to take.
ECOUNS:WPiez
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6.

One of the central features of American foreign policy

in Asia is our commitment, expressed in the Shanghai
Cowmunique, to achieve an eventual normalization of relations
beh1een our country and the PRC.

This is a policy objective

which not only President Carter but also Presidents Nixon
and Ford have supported in the belief, which I share, that
a betterment of US-China relations would contribute to the
general peace and stability of Asia.

As with many other

foreign policy issues, there has been some public debate within the U.S. over norrealization, particularly the
the interests of the people of Taiwan

~ight

~anner

in which

best be protected.

In my opinion, the basic difficulty we face lies not with the
objective of normalization itself, but rather the wanner and
L

atmosphere in which we accowplish this end.

We do not want our

progress toward better relations with China to be perceived as
destabilizing or disruptive by either the governments and
people of the Asian region or by the American people themselves.
Nov this is a diplonatic and political question of some
subtlety and complexity and I'll leave any detailed speculation
as to the best answer to the President and his advisors in
Washington.

I am, however, personally confident that this is

not an insoluble 9roblem for us, that throuc,h t!1e best efforts
of both the Chinese and American sides, we can achieve our
mutual goal of normalization of relations.

As for the second part of your question, it is not really
appropriate for me to comment publicly on the specifics of
Japan's relations with China or any other third country.
The mechanics, the timing, the language and details of your
bilateral diplomacy -- whether in regard to the Proposed
Treaty or possible territorial questions

these are all

matters which are the proper concern solely of the Japanese
and Chinese governments.

I can, however, say this.

It is

clear to me that both the Japanese and American peoples share
a basic interest in promoting peace, stability an& ·development
in East Asia.

And in this context, the achievement and

improvement of friendly and prosperous relations between Japan
and China, the two most important countries of East Asia,
should be considered as a positive and major accomplishment.

7.

I can only speak for my own government, so I certainly

would not presume to try to explain or predict the Soviet
Union's policies toward Japan.

That part of your question

might better be directed to my diplomatic colleague
Ambassador Polyanskiy.

As for our own relations with the Soviet Union, it is
clear that there are and will continue to be profound
differences between the American and Soviet governments on
basic questions relating to freedoM and individual liberties.
Similarly, there are serious and troubling elements of
competition between our two countries on a broad range of
strategic and international issues.

At the same time, however,

we also recognize that the Soviet Union and the U.S. share
a number of critically important interests, not the least of
which is the paramount need to avoid destructive global conflict .

My government is committed to exploring these comMon

interests and using them as a basis for expanding the possible
areas of mutual cooperation between our two countries.
We are approaching our relations with the Soviet Union with no
false illusions or unrealistic expectations, but rather with a
hope for progress and in the spirit of mutual respect .

8.

Japan's self defense forces have high morale, excellent

leadership and training; they play an indispensable role in
the defense of Japan.

Japan's recent decisions to improve

its anti-submarine and air interception capabilities are, I
believe, moves in the right direction and are appropriate
complements to United States force deployments.

I also am

encouraged by the work of the Subcommittee on Defense
Cooperation, which I believe will contribute to a further
strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.
Now, as to the specifics of what Japan should do in the
defense field, that is basically a Japanese decision.

9.

You start with several premises to which I would not

subscribe.

I disagree with your statement that the Soviets

"hold command of the Japan Sea."

They are, of course, a

major naval presence in this part of the world, but I have
confidenc e in the superiority of the forces of the United
States and its allies.

Secondly, I do not agree that the phased and gradual withdrawal of our ground forces from South Korea would have a
negative impact on the overall security of Northeast

~sia.

On the contrary, we have taken, and will continue to pursue,
a number of measures to ensure that the withdrawal will not
upset the existing political-military balance.

Among other

things, I would point to:
The President's strong and

una~biguous

reaffirmation

of our defense committment to South Korea;
Our plans to maintain, and in some cases strengthen,
important U.S. support and air units remaining in the
ROK and our other forces elsewhere in the Pacific;
Our intention to assist in the accelerated
qualitative improvement of the ROK military forces;
and the recent demonstration afforded by the Team
Spirit 78 exercise of our ability to meet our defense
commitment in Korea repidly and effectively.
Now there are some people who argue that, despite all of
the measures I just mentioned, the phased withdrawal of the
Second Division nevertheless represents a dramatic shift in
our Korean policy, that it reflects an American retreat from
this part of the world.

Here again, I would have to disagree.

For almost thirty years the U.S. has played a key role in
supporting the defense and economic development of the South
Korean people through a broad range of military, diplomatic
and economic means.

During that period South Korea has grown

dramatically stronger and consequently, it is not particularly
surprising that we are able to adjust the specifics of our
support and assistance to the changing nature of the Korean
environment.

In this connection, the gradual withdrawal of

the Second Division, only one element of our overall support
for the ROK, is a continuation of a policy of reducing our
ground combat presence in South Korea first set forth in the
early 1970s.

This is no sudden or dramtic shift.

It is important to remember that this withdrawal we are
speaking of is going to spread out over the next four years.
Obviously, there is always the possibility that during that
time frame there might be developments which could have a
bearing on these withdrawal plans.
as to all the details of the future.

I won't try to speculate
But I am basically

confident that four years from now we are going to be able
to look back and see that this particular withdrawal of the
Second Division has not impaired the ability of the ROK to
defend itself nor upset the equilibrium of Northeast Asis.
As for the last part of your question, I think that
the current controversy surrounding alleged Korean influencepeddling and bribery in the U.S. is a particularly unfortunate,
indeed tragic, episode.

For all the headlines and political

heat that it has generated thus far, at heart it is not
representativ e in any way of the deeply-rooted friendship

and common interests that have brought the American and
South Korean peoples together.

As such, it should not be

allowed to affect the larger and more important aspects of
the U.S.-ROK relationship.

For that .reason, I believe that

it is critically important that all the parties concerned
exert their best efforts for a rapid and mutually satisfactory
conclusion of this sorry affair.
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